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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIE[V
Trusts-Power to Execute Long Term Leases
In In re Menzel's Wilt' a trustee sought court authority to execute a
lease of trust property that would run beyond the probable duration of the
trust. The settlor, as an executor, and her co-executor had granted a
lease to certain real property located in the business district of Min-
neapolis. The lease agreement was for 99 years, from 1906 to 30 April,
2005, and it would terminate absolutely at the expiration of that term.
This lease provided for a net annual cash rental of $8,000 and there was
no provision for readjustment of this figure.
Under the testamentary trust created by the settlor, her interest in
this land and lease were to be held by the trustee for two named bene-
ficiaries for life, the trust to terminate upon the death of the survivor and
the res to be distributed to the three children of one of the beneficiaries
or to their surviving lineal descendants 'and in the absence of lineal
descendants, that share to the surviving individuals or their representa-
tives. One of the three remaindermen had been declared dead and the
other two presently have a total of ten children. The appellant had been
named guardian ad litem of these ten children and any other contingent
remaindermen who may now or in the future have an interest in the trust.
The trustee also held an interest in the land and lease as guardian for
one of the beneficiaries who is an incompetent. The other beneficiary of
the trust held the remaining undivided interest in the land and lease and
joined with the appellee, who was acting as trustee and guardian with
respect to the other two undivided interests in the land, in seeking the
Court's permission in 1956 to negotiate a new lease agreement.
The new agreement for which court approval was sought amends the
1906 lease and, in part, provided for: (1) An immediate increase in rent
from $8,000 to $16,000 per year with provisions for readjustments be-
tween $12,000 and $31,000 per year; (2) an extension of the lease from
30 April 2005 to 30 April 2055; (3) an option to buy the property in
2055 in accordance with an appraisal as of 30 April 2052; and (4) an
option to extend the lease to 30 April 2105 if the option to buy is not
exercised.
All adult persons in being having any interest gave their written
possible in most jurisdictions because it would give the transferees interests in the
whole tract when their metes and bounds descriptions only purported to give them
an interest in one half. A conveyance cannot pass the property beyond the bounds
of the area described. Potter v. Wallace, 185 Ky. 528, 215 S. W. 538 (1919) ;
Kenoye v. Brown, 82 Miss. 607, 35 So. 163 (1903) ; Brown v. Pearson, 180 S. W.
895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915). But see Young v. Edwards, 33 S. C. 404, 11 S. E.
1066 (1890) holding that if at all possible, the portion conveyed to the grantee by
metes and bounds will be set off to him upon partition, but if it cannot be done, the
warranties in the deed will give him by estoppel the part that is set off to the
grantor.
1247 Minn. 559, 77 N. W. 2d 833 (1956).
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consent to the amended lease agreement; but the guardian ad litem on
behalf of the contingent remainderment objected and pointed out that
the trust will terminate upon the death of the last surviving beneficiary,
that the beneficiaries have life expectancies of 12, 11 and 9.47 years, and
that the rule prohibiting a trustee from entering into a lease which ex-
tends beyond the known or probable termination date of the trust is
thereby violated. The Court held that the amendment was authorized
since it was reasonable under the circumstances and was in the best
interests of the trust and of the trust beneficiaries.
While resting its decision on statutory authority, the Court acknowl-
edged the broad powers conferred by the trust instrument and cited that
grant of powers in support of its holding. However, the significance
of the decision that the trustee had power to lease the trust property
for long terms extending beyond the duration of the trust is not di-
minished by the fact that the court based its decision primarily on
statutes. For the court indicated that it could have reached the same
decision without the aid of statutes and stated, with respect to the
applicable portions of these statutes, that they ". . . are declaratory of
the well recognized and inherent power of the court to authorize leas-
ing .. ."2 The statutory provisions so construed state, "The district
court may, by order, on such terms and conditions as seem just and
proper, in respect to rentals and renewals, authorized such a trustee to
lease such real property for a term exceeding five years, if it appears to
the satisfaction of the court that it is for the best interest of the trust
estate, . . ."3 Therefore, it is necessary to review the case law dealing
with this issue in order to determine the proper basis for such a holding
in the absence of statutory authority.
By express provision in the trust instrument, a settlor may give the
trustee power to execute leases which will run beyond the duration of
the trust and leases made in compliance with that provision will be
binding upon the remainderman. The power being exercised, it in effect
2 Id. at 567, 77 N. W. 2d at 838.
M. S. A. § 501.22 Subd. 4 (1945); M. S. A. § 501.24 (1945) contains sub-
stantially the same provisions. The statutes referred to here are the counterpart
of a New York statute and apparently they were adopted from it. See 4 BoGoRT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 791 (1948) and Note, 14 MINN. L. Rav. 274 at 281
(1930). In addition, these statutes provide that where a trustee is to hold real
property during the life of a beneficiary and pay the income received from it to
the use of the beneficiary, the trustee may lease the property for a term not
exceeding five years without application to the court. M. S. A. § 501.22 Subd. 3
(1945) ; M. S. A. § 501.24 (1945). It is this section of the statute that changed the
state of the law and this provision has been held to be an extension of the power
of the trustee rather than a restriction. And, where prior to the statute such a
lease was valid only until the termination of the trust, it was now valid for any
term up to five years regardless of the duration of the trust itself. This is pointed
out in Weir v. Barker, 104 App. Div. 1112, 93 N. Y. Supp. 732 (1905) ; 54 Am. JUR.,
Trusts § 474 (1945) ; Annot., 61 A. L. R. 1368 (1928).
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limits the estate of those entitled at the termination of the trust.4 This
express power to lease is of two types. First, the settlor may have
auhorized a lease for a definite term; or, second, the settlor may have
given the trustee unlimited power to lease. In the latter case, the trustee
is subject only to the conditions that the terms of the lease be reasonable,
that he acted in good faith, and in the best interests of the trust.
Although the power to lease is not expressly given, it may be impliedly
given where it is necessary to the performance of other duties expressly
conferred upon the trustee and where it will enable him to carry out the
purposes and intents of the settlor.6 The trust instrument, and all the
surrounding circumstances determine whether or not his implied power
exists and if so its scope. Such power has been raised by implication
where the trustee was directed to receive and dispose of rents, profits,
and income to certain beneficiaries and purposes ;7 and where the trustee
was given the "entire control, management, and charge of the estate."
In the principal case, the settlor provided that the trustees "shall have
and as freely exercise all rights and powers of dominion and ownership
over and with respect to . .,. the trust estate as I could or might exercise
if living.... The trustees ... are ... to collect the principal, income,
rents, issues, profits, and accruals thereof, and ... to pay, .. . and dis-
tribute the same ... for the use and benefit of the beneficiaries. . .."
In light of the above decisions and the nature of the trust property, this
language is clearly sufficient to raise an implication of a power in the
trustee to lease.
Where the trustee exercises an implied power to lease without first
making application to the courts, two questions are raised as to the
validity of that lease. First, is the term of the lease reasonable ?1o Factors
determinative of the reasonableness of such leases are the nature and
location of the property, the ordinary and customary periods of leases
of that type of property in that locality, the rights of the beneficiaries and
remaindermen, the purposes of the trust, and the uses for which the trust
property can reasonably be devoted. 1 Second, can a lease reasonably be
executed by a trustee which will extend beyond the duration of the trust?
It is generally held that in the absence of express or statutory authority
the trustee is without power to execute leases extending beyond the
'Raynolds v. Browning, King and Co., 217 App. Div. 443, 217 N. Y. Supp. 15(1920), aff'd inem., 245 N. Y. 623, 157 N. E. 884 (1927) 2 ScoTT ON TRUSTS § 189.3
(1956).
'4 BOGERT, TRUST AND TRUSTEES §§ 782, 783 (1948).
54 Ag JIUR., Trusts § 471 (1945).7 Hutcheson v. Hodnett, 115 Ga. 990, 42 S. E. 422 (1902) ; Cox v. Kinston C. R.
and Lumber Co., 175 N. C. 299, 95 S. E. 623 (1918).8 Upham v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, 140 N. W. 5 (1913).
247 Minn. 559, 564, 77 N. W. 2d 833, 836 (1956).
"°Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 Atl. 648 (1929); 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES, § 786 (1948) ; 2 ScOTr ON TRUSTS § 189.1 (1956).
1154 Am. JUR., Trusts § 472 (1945) ; 90 C. J. S., Trusts § 319 (1955).
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duration of the trust; or, where the term of the trust is uncertain, beyond
the probable duration of the trust. Such leases are not binding on the
remainderman, the excess of the lease beyond the life of the trust being
void.12  However, where the duration of the trust is uncertain, a lease
extending beyond the probable duration of the trust is valid for the actual
duration of the trust, if it is otherwise reasonable. 1 3 There is a minority
view that such leases are binding upon the remaindermen if they are
reasonable and if they give effect to the scheme and intent of the settlor.
The fact that the lease extends beyond the duration of the trust is a factor
to consider in determining the reasonableness of the term.14 Therefore,
if a trustee relying on implied authority to lease has any doubt as to
the necessity for or reasonableness of a particular lease, or his power to
execute that lease; he should, for the protection of the trust and himself,
secure court authority in advance of its execution. 15 If he acts without
such authorization, the lease may be void as to the remainderman and
he may be liable for breach of trust. He may be liable even where he
could have obtained court authority for such a lease by prior application
to the court.' 6
In proper cases, courts of equity have power to authorize a lease of
trust property for a period longer than that expressly or impliedly per-
mitted by the terms of the trust or beyond the duration or probable
duration of the trust and such a lease will be binding on the remainder-
man.17 Whether a particular case is a proper one will depend largely
upon the jurisdiction in which the case arises and the circumstances of
that case. Circumstances to be considered are: (1) changes in economic
conditions; (2) changes in the physical condition of the property; (3)
changes in the purposes for which the property may be used; and (4)
changes in the neighborhood in which the property is situated.' 8 The
court may direct or permit a departure from the terms of the trust where
a change of circumstances unknown and unanticipated by the settlor
would defeat or substantially impair the fulfillment of the intent and pur-
poses of the trust.19 There is a division of opinion, as evidenced by
"Re Caswell, 197 Wis. 327, 222 N. W. 235 (1928); 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 787 (1948); Annot., 61 A. L. R. 1368 (1928).182 SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 189.2 (1956).
1 Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 Atl. 648 (1929) ; Noted in 14 MINN. L.
R. 194, 274 (1930); 90 C. J. S., TRUSTS § 319 (1955); 4 BOGER, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 788, 789 (1948). Bogert lists Delaware, Maryland, Maine and Con-
necticut in the minority group and takes a position tending to favor the minority
rule, especially where modem business property in large cities is involved.
1" Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 At. 548 (1929).
144 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 790 (1948); 54 Am. JuR., Trusts §
474 (1945).
° 0T Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73 N. E. 409 (1905).
1 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 790 (1948).
2 SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 167 (1956); 54 Am. JuR., Trusts § 284 (1945).
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the cases, as to what circumstances constitute an exigency that warrants
the authorization of such long term leases.
A minority of courts have authorized long term leases for which
there was no express or statutory provision in cases where it found: (1)
that the execution of such lease was within the implied power of the
trustee ;20 (2) that it was necessary to permit such a deviation from the
express terms of the trust because exigencies arose after the death of
the settlor which would practically defeat the trust; and (3) that the
proposed lease was reasonably designed to meet these changes. Under
these circumstances, these courts will assume the position of the settlor
and grant such equitable relief as it in its sound discretion deems best to
accomplish the purposes of the trust.2 1 The court may exercise this
power in order to assure a proper income to the beneficiaries.22  State-
ments representative of language which the courts have found to convey
an implied power to execute such leases appear in Upham v. Plankinton28
and in In re Grays Estate.2 4 In the Upham case, the trust instrument
conferred upon the trustee the "entire control, management, and charge
of the estate" and the court stated that there was an implied power to
-execute leases for reasonable terms, that a 99 year lease was not un-
reasonable under the circumstances, and that it was in the best interest of
the estate. The testator, in In re Gray's Estate, stated that the trustees
should have the power to "manage and control ... sell and convey" any
part of the trust estate. The court held that the execution of a 99 year
-lease was not beyond the powers of trustees conferred upon them by the
testator. Even in the absence of terminology in the trust instrument
from which power to execute a long term lease could be implied and
where there was no necessity to preserve the corpus of the trust, several
cases have gone so far as to authorize the execution of 99 year leases on
the ground that without such relief the trust property would become
20 Marshall's Trustee v. Marshall, 225 Ky. 168, 7 S. W. 2d 1062 (1928) ; Upham
v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, 140 N. W. 5 (1913).
2 Packard v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 261 Ill. 450, 104 N. E. 275 (1914)
Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73 N. E. 409 (1905); Smith v. Widmann Hotel
Co., 74 S. D. 118, 49 N. W. 2d 301 (1951).
222 ScoTT oN TRUSTS § 189.4 (1956).
22 152 Wis. 275, 140 N. W. 5 (1910). In this case the settlor left valuable busi-
ness property in trust. The value of the land had greatly increased but the buildings
had deteriorated so that very large capital outlays would be necessary to adequately
improve the property. In order to secure lessees willing to make such improvements
on the property, the trustees wanted approval of 99 year leases which it had
negotiated. The trust would terminate upon the death of a beneficiary who had a
life expectancy of approximately 16 years.
24 196 Wis. 383, 220 N. W. 175 (1928). In this case the property in question was
a lot in a city business district renting at $1,400 per annum. The value of the
property had increased rapidly since the creation of the trust. The proposed lease
provided for the erection of a building by the lessee costing not less than $100,000
with rent increasing over a 50 year period from $3,500 to $7,500 and then for the
next 49 years at $7,500 per annum. The trust was for the life of the settlor's
daughter and until a grandson should reach 30 years of age.
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"substantially unproductive" ;25 or that it was a good business venture
and beneficial to all interested parties. 26
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the majority of the courts are more
hesitant to permit a long term lease where- exigencies have arisen if the
existence of the trust is not clearly endangered. In these jurisdictions,
it must be shown that such leases are absolutely necessary to preserve
the trust estate.27 A long term lease, even though it is an advantageous
one, will not be permitted if the trust can be preserved with leases of
shorter duration.28 The fact that a 99 year lease may be beneficial to all
parties in interest is not sufficient reason to authorize it.29 The emphasis
is on preservation and, in the absence of express power in the trustee
to execute such a lease, the court will not authorize it unless it is
essential to the preservation of the corpus of the trust.3 0 The majority
view places considerable emphasis upon the protection of the remainder-
man. The long term leases are rejected because of the feeling that they
confer benefits upon the benficiary at the expense of the remainderman 3l
in contradiction of the settlor's expressed plan for distribution of his
property.3 2 Weight is also placed upon the fact that the remainderman
is deprived of a valuable right by a long term lease in that he is ordi-
narily entitled to possession of the property, free of encumbrances and
restrictions, upon the termination of the trust.33
In the principal case, the court states that where, "because of changed
conditions caused by monetary devaluation, the beneficiaries are deprived
of substantial income which the settlor intended them to have" relief
should be granted the same as it is in cases where such relief is necessary
to preserve the corpus.3 4 Since the power to lease may be inferred from
the testatrix's will, and in view of the circumstances-the present low
rental, the term for which the present lease will run, the great increase
in benefits that will accrue to the beneficiaries and remainderman, the
provisions for adjustments in rent, the type and location of the property,
and the approval of the adult remaindermen-the holding in this case is
an equitable one even though it is not necessary to preserve the trust
estate and even though the lease probably will extend 80 years beyond
the life of the trust; and may, if the option is exercised, outlast the trust
by 130 years. Although contra to the majority view, it is submitted
that this approach is the more desirable one under the circumstances.
"' Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263, 56 N. E. 306 (1900).
" Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73 N. E. 409 (1905).
" 4 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 790 (1948).
" Hubbell v. Hubbell, 135 Iowa 637, 113 N. W. 512 (1907).
" Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 Atl. 648 (1929).
" Re Caswell, 197 Wis. 327, 222 N. W. 235 (1928).
"Ibid.
"4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 790 (1948).
"2 Scorr oN TRUSTS § 189.2 (1956).
,247 Minn. 559, 569, 77 N. W. 2d 833, 839 (1956).
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Apparently, there are no cases in North Carolina involving leases for
a period of 99 years. But there are two cases where, without express
authority in the trust instrument, the trustee leased the property for
long terms, the longest period being for 30 years. The cases, Cox v.
Kinston C. R. and Lumber Co.35 and Waddell v. United Cigar Stores of
Anterica,3 6 may give some indication of the position our Court would take
if a case involving a 99 year lease arose. In the Cox case, the Court
found that the trust was to terminate at the death of the trustee.
The trustee, at the age of 66 and without prior court approval,
entered into a lease with the defendant. The lease was to run for five
years with options in the lessee so that it could run for twenty years if
the options were exercised. Seven years later the trustee died, the
remaindermen sought possession and the defendant contended that he
had exercised his option. The court held that the trustee had no power
to execute a lease which would extend beyond the duration of the
trust. The Court classified the cases on this subject as those where the
trustee attempted to lease without securing court authorization and
those where he asked the authorization of the court before executing the
lease. The court was of the opinion that, in cases of the first type, it was
uniformly held that a trustee has no power to execute a lease extending
beyond the duration of the trust and that, in the latter class, courts of
equity have the power to enlarge the powers of the trustee. As a general
proposition, this classification reflects the trend of authority. Undoubted-
ly, where there is no express authority, the trustee would be well advised
to seek court advice before executing a lease of this nature. But, it may
be noted that there is some authority for the view that the lease may not
be invalidated by the trustee's failure to seek court approval in advance
if the court would have approved the lease if the trustee had asked for
its approval prior to the execution of the lease and if the power to lease
can be implied and shown to have been necessarily exercised.3 7
In the Waddell case, the trust was to terminate upon the death of two
designated beneficiaries who had life expectancies of 44.9 and 45.5 years.
The trustee proposed to lease the property to the defendant for 30 years
and initiated this action for the purpose of obtaining the Court's advance
approval. The trial court found that the trustee had an implied power
to lease.38 Since the two beneficiaries had life expectancies considerably
longer than the term of the proposed lease and the trustee had implied
175 N. C. 299, 95 S. E. 623 (1918).8195 N. C. 434, 142 S. E. 585 (1928) ; See, Note, 7 N. C. L. Rav. 94 (1929).
McCrory v. Beeler, 155 Md. 456, 142 A. 587, 588 (1928) ; Grady v. Robinson,
180 Ore. 315, 175 P. 2d 463 (1946).
"' The language from which authority to lease could be implied gave the trustee
power "to handle, manage, control and improve in such way as to him may seem
desirable and to collect all income." Waddell v. United Cigar Stores of America,
195 N. C. 434, 435, 142 S. E. 585, 586 (1929).
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power to lease, the court found that the issue that trustees may not
execute leases extending beyond the duration of the trust without express
authority was not necessarily raised. In view of these two decisions,
it appears that a trustee, With only implied authority to lease, may validly
execute leases which will not extend beyond the probable duration of
the trust. But, where the lease will extend beyond the probable life of
the trust, the excess will not bind the remainderman if the trustee failed
to secure advance court approval. If the trustee makes application to
the court for its approval in advance, it appears that he may be authorized
to execute such lease as is absolutely necessary to preserve the trust.
However, if the North Carolina Court should be consulted in a case
similar on its facts to the principal case, on the basis of the two cases
considered above, it is doubtful if it would approve such a lease.
CHARLES J. NooE
Workmen's Compensation-Eye Injuries and Loss of Vision
The amount of compensation awarded for eye injuries is considerable
although such injuries account for a very small percentage of the
Workmen's Compensation cases. Earning power is often dependent
upon visual acuity and an employee deserves high compensation for the
loss or impairment of his sight. In New York it has been estimated that
eye injuries constitute approximately three per cent of all industrial
injuries but the average cost for eye injuries is about twice the average
for other injuries.' In North Carolina during the period July 1, 1954,
to June 30, 1955, there were 137 cases involving eye injuries closed by
the Industrial Commission and the amount of compensation was
$354,975.00.2
Loss of vision is compensable under all the Workmen's Compensation
statutes.- A specified sum for loss of an eye is granted and total loss of
vision is usually compensated for as loss of an eye. Under the North
Carolina statute an employee suffering an eye injury resulting in total
loss of vision is granted sixty per cent of his average weekly wages during
one hundred and twenty weeks.8
Partial loss is compensated in such proportion as the partial loss bears
to the total loss and an eighty-five per cent, or more, loss- is deemed
"industrial blindness" and compensated as total loss of vision.4
'Davidson, The State Labor Department Ophthalmologist, 8 INDUSTRIAL MEDI-
ciNE, Number 4, 153.
'Letter from Mr. R. F. Thomas, Deputy Commissioner, North Carolina Indus-
trial Commission, to Herbert L. Toms, Jr., January 22, 1957.
S N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (q).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (t) : "Total loss of use of a member or loss of vision
of an eye shall be considered as equivalent to the loss of such member or eye. The
compensation for partial loss of or for partial loss of use of a member or for partial
loss of vision of an eye or for partial loss of hearing shall be such proportion of
19571
